Thinking the unthinkable as a radical scientific project by Fuller, Steve
 University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap 
This paper is made available online in accordance with 
publisher policies. Please scroll down to view the document 
itself. Please refer to the repository record for this item and our 
policy information available from the repository home page for 
further information. 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
Author(s): Steve Fuller 
Article Title: Thinking the Unthinkable as a Radical Scientific 
Project 
Year of publication: 2010 
Link to published article: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2010.541691 
Publisher statement: This is an electronic version of an article 
published in Fuller, S. (2010). Thinking the Unthinkable as a Radical 
Scientific Project, 22(4). pp. 397-413. Critical Review (Philadelphia): a 
journal of politics and society is available online at: 
www.tandfonline.com 
 1 
THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE AS A RADICAL SCIENTIFIC PROJECT 
Steve Fuller 
 
One of Philip Tetlock‟s more bracing studies of counterfactual reasoning in political 
judgement concerns what he calls „thinking the unthinkable‟ (Tetlock 2003), recalling 
the title of Herman Kahn‟s notorious 1962 book about our prospects of surviving a 
limited nuclear war, which Kahn regarded as reasonably good. In what follows, I shall 
explore the significance of using the strategy implied here for the study of expertise – 
namely, experts and lay people are persuaded to consider possibilities whose 
realization they would normally oppose, perhaps even in principle. Before turning to 
my own examples, I shall focus on Tetlock (2005), which is mostly a scientific study 
of political judgement. However, the import of the study, which systematically 
undermines the time-honoured distinction between „political judgement‟ and „political 
science‟, is generalisable across many fields that claim to uphold a sharp divide 
between the experienced practitioner and the theoretically informed scientist. In 
Tetlock‟s hands, the scientist appears to come out the stronger party, although, so I 
shall argue, at the cost of assuming some responsibility for the fate of the practices he 
has experimentally disrupted. I should say at the outset that for me this point is more 
of a challenge than a criticism of Tetlock‟s work, which I strongly support.   
 
To be sure, the distinction between political judgement and political science has been 
drawn at different times, on different grounds and to different effect. For example, 
Plato‟s „political science‟ might be read as aiming to transcend the volatility of 
opinion in which Aristotle‟s conception of „political judgement‟ naturally swims and 
arguably renders a virtue, given the value he placed on rhetoric. However, as an 
academic discipline called „political science‟ emerged in the 20th century that self-
consciously modelled itself on the methods of the natural sciences, „political 
judgement‟ became increasingly consigned to that amalgam of tradition-cum-personal 
experience that has been often mystified as „tacit knowledge‟ (Polanyi 1957). 
Moreover, „political judgement‟ in this sense was supposedly not limited to practicing 
politicians but also possessed by political commentators, or „pundits‟, whose stock in 
trade is to predict phenomena ranging from emerging trends to election outcomes. 
While Tetlock‟s official target is punditry, his systematically analytic approach to 
politics in aid of a nomothetic perspective casts substantial doubt on whether even 
politicians know more about policy-making than political scientists. Indeed, Tetlock 
presumes that „political judgement‟ in some normatively desirable sense is ultimately 
a species of applied political science, in that politicians and political scientists are 
engaged in the same sorts of cognitive processes (including biases), albeit subject to 
rather different time and resource constraints.  
 
Let us start by stepping back and asking a basic question: Why is prediction an 
epistemically significant activity at all?  No one doubts that it is fun, and sometimes 
lucrative, to forecast the winners of games and elections and to place bets at a casino 
or invest in the stock market. But beyond the entertainment value – the long-term 
psychological effects of which should not underestimated – predictions serve three 
epistemic functions.  
 
First, they force us to simulate a state of the actual world, typically one located in the 
future. This goes against the grain of how we normally register things, namely, as a 
space of possibilities that are realized to varying degrees as we move through space 
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and time, responding to external cues; hence, the fluidity of our memory and 
imagination (For a psychology that has taken this point as foundational for the 
discipline, see Hammond and Stewart 2001). For the predictor, this fluidity becomes 
the source of fallibility.  
 
Second, predictions are not only about the actual world but also in it. They are public 
events that cannot accommodate the full range of world-views that people normally 
carry around in the heads, which are easily adjusted in the face of events in which 
they have no personal investment. But predictions demand just such investments and 
hence, in the face of failure, potentially exact unwelcomed costs.  
 
Third, precisely because predictions are public events experienced by predictors and 
their audiences, preparations of various sorts can be made in the time leading up to a 
prediction‟s outcome. Although professional predictors are loath to admit it, 
predictions may even be said to license, if not authorise these activities. Together they 
trigger a society‟s cognitive immune system, so to speak. Here we enter the realm of 
self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies – but equally the space for radically 
revising one‟s world-view while still appearing rational, the mark of a theory‟s 
falsifiability that Karl Popper deemed to be the cornerstone of the scientific method. 
 
Now, let us develop an implicit distinction in Tetlock‟s discussion of failed 
predictions: „almost right (but wrong)‟ versus „almost wrong (but right)‟. Tetlock 
tends to treat claims to the former as self-justifying defensive responses to predictive 
failure. At the same time, he seems to regard the latter as the presumptive epistemic 
state of most predictive successes. In other words, Tetlock holds all political 
predictors guilty of systemic error, until proven otherwise. It is easy to appreciate his 
suspicion mainly because by playing on the ambiguous epistemic space between 
„almost right‟ and „almost wrong‟, it is easy to leave the impression that one is exactly 
right. I tested this hypothesis against one of the best publicised „successful‟ social 
scientific predictions of recent times, namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union, made 
in 1978 by the distinguished US sociologist, Randall Collins (1995). On closer 
inspection, the prediction turns out to be both „almost right‟ and „almost wrong‟ but in 
any case, not exactly right. While Collins‟ general theoretical model was vindicated in 
that he predicted that the tipping point would come from social movements mobilising 
around dissenting elites, it failed to assign a specific role to the media in expediting 
this mobilisation. Thus, a process that on the basis of past revolutions Collins had 
predicted would take 30-50 years ended up happening in a little more than a decade.  
 
Chapter one of Tetlock (2005) provides a set of compelling reasons for not trusting 
correct predictions of any sort. After all, anyone who predicts regularly is bound to hit 
a few targets – and if you predict the same target long enough, you are bound to hit 
that one. In these cases, one should be looking for the predictor‟s success/failure ratio. 
There is also the methodological problem of deciding exactly what had been predicted 
and whether it actually occurred. Unless one is predicting a specific outcome in an 
independently determined process, such as an election result, one may be faced with a 
hopelessly moving target, as predictors rationally reconstruct both their initial and 
final knowledge states. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, Tetlock suggests that 
successful predictions may be based on normatively dubious forms of knowledge that 
involve insider information, torture and coercion, or quite simply models of the 
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human condition based on deep-seated „irrational‟ tendencies that we might be 
otherwise wish to minimise or eliminate in the future. 
 
Tetlock‟s gold standard of political judgement combines the two leading 
philosophical theories of truth, correspondence and coherence – namely, one predicts 
the right thing and for the right reasons. On the one hand, the predictor must do better 
than being „right but almost wrong‟, in that she must have a coherent causal account 
of why an event should have occurred, not just the simple claim that it would occur. 
On the other hand, the predictor must do better than being „wrong but almost right‟, in 
that her conceptually sound model must also capture specific actual outcomes. This is 
the context for understanding Tetlock‟s appropriation of the contrast first popularised 
by Erasmus of the fox and the hedgehog, the former knowing many little things and 
the latter one big one. Foxy predictors are always on the verge of incoherence, whilst 
the hedgehogs fail on strict accuracy.  
 
The value of crystallising political judgement as the ability to predict the right thing 
for the right reasons is that such a prediction forces you to confront the modal 
structure of your world-view, not least the amount of control that you ascribe to the 
agents populating it. Instead of parsing the difference between hedgehogs and foxes 
as the number of things that they “know,” one might say that foxes operate with what 
I have called an „underdetermined‟ world-view, one that allows for many reversals of 
fate, whereas hedgehogs adopt an „overdetermined‟ world-view that posits a dominant 
tendency onto which all paths ultimately converge (Fuller 2008). Foxes see hidden 
necessary conditions where hedgehogs detect only temporary interference to the main 
narrative flow. Much of this boils down to historical standpoint: Foxes see the world 
in prospect, hedgehogs in retrospect. Those for whom politics consists of lurching 
from one election to the next tend to behave like foxes, whereas hedgehogs are more 
likely to see politics as long-term movements of social transformation. Much of the 
authority that hedgehogs command in the media – something that Tetlock bemoans – 
may be attributed to their ability to speak as if their world-view is destined to triumph 
whilst they address questions of how exactly that is supposed to happen. They make 
up for their predictive inaccuracy by personifying the future they would see come 
about. As I shall explore below, this point suggests that hedgehog may not be quite 
the right species for these pundits. 
 
It is not clear whether Tetlock is interested in improving political judgement for its 
own sake or to improve the conduct of public life. In any case, the two goals are 
distinct and each controversial in its own way, the latter perhaps more so. On the one 
hand, Tetlock might be making a case for the cultivation of intellectual virtue in the 
punditry, which would be in line with his implicit view that political judgement is an 
unrigorous version of applied political science. But on the other hand, would the 
conduct of public life itself be improved if pundits could be nudged to issue more 
accurate predictions, to own up to their failures, and to update their beliefs in ways 
that conform to the probability axioms and Bayes‟ theorem? The answer is not clear, 
mainly due to lack of evidence about the consequences of such changes.  
 
Now consider a more modest policy to improve the conduct of public life that does 
not require any instruction of the punditry: a careful media record of pundits‟ success 
ratio. Even if, as Tetlock himself seems to believe, this policy would improve public 
life, would it be the result of people gravitating to the pundits with better track 
 4 
records?  On the contrary, the exercise might give people the opportunity to infer the 
narrative thread that connects the various predictions made and then decide whether 
they would like to contribute to a more exact realization of the narrative so inferred. I 
purposely say „inferred‟ rather than „implied‟ in order to allow that people will project 
unintended meanings onto track records. For example, a string of „near miss‟ 
predictions by a pundit who sends a clear message – one of Tetlock‟s hedgehogs – 
might spur those resonant to the message to transform the political-economic order in 
ways that increase the likelihood that the pundit‟s predictions will hit their targets in 
the future. Even if the pundit herself recognised with hindsight the incompetence of 
these predictions, that need not stop others from interpreting them as evidence for a 
systematically suppressed reality that deserves full expression. 
 
We normally think of self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies as resulting from 
the prior announcement of a prediction that triggers actions contributing to its 
fulfilment or defeat. But here we are considering the prospect of a self-avenging 
prophecy inspired by the attractiveness of the alternative reality inferred from a string 
of already falsified predictions. This point can be fully appreciated by adding to 
Tetlock‟s political menagerie. The fox has had many foils – not only Erasmus‟ 
hedgehog but also Machiavelli‟s lion: The lion rules by focused shows of force, as 
opposed to the fox‟s diverse displays of cunning. Whereas the fox cajoles and adapts, 
often with the net effect of dissipating its energies, the lion is inclined simply to 
eliminate opponents who stand in its way. In that respect, the lion extends the 
hedgehog‟s explanatory idée fixe into political strategy, as, say, when a Marxist 
academic crosses the line from possessing a hegemonic theory to being possessed by 
a hegemonic ideology.  
 
Tetlock‟s failure to take the full measure of leonine politics can be seen in his 
conclusion that hedgehogs fare better in static environments and foxes in more 
dynamic ones (Tetlock 2005: 251). He presumes that both political animals simply 
adapt to the world -- albeit each in its own inimitable way -- rather than create new 
opportunities, let alone recover lost ones intimated in their failed predictions. This is 
probably an artefact of Tetlock‟s treatment of political judgements as, to recall the old 
speech act jargon, „constatives‟ rather than „performatives‟ (Austin 1962). In other 
words, his concern is exclusively with whether the judgements match up against their 
target referents rather than with whatever consequences might flow from the very fact 
that those judgements were issued. Thus, Tetlock may be guilty of misreading the 
mass media‟s preference for pundits who are hedgehogs rather than foxes. These 
hedgehogs may be lions in disguise – that is, pundits whose predictions are 
themselves meant to be interventions that reinforce or subvert existing political 
tendencies. Here the media may not be so much reporting politics as providing an 
alternative channel for its conduct. From this standpoint, Tetlock‟s own disruptive 
research constitutes a counter-move, one designed precisely to inhibit the hedgehog‟s 
more leonine tendencies by luring pundits from their epistemic comfort zones, thereby 
revealing the limits of their expertise. It is clear that of the two species of pundit, 
Tetlock prefers the fox, not least because its more self-consciously limited horizons 
give it less capacity for causing lasting damage. 
 
Critics often accuse me of „scepticism‟ about expertise because I see expertise 
primarily in sociological rather than epistemological terms (e.g. Fuller 1988: chap. 12; 
Fuller 2002: chap. 3; cf. Selinger 2003). In short, for me an expert is someone whose 
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word is presumed by other people to decide matters of a certain kind. To be sure, the 
expert‟s decision may be underwritten by a coherent body of reliable and relevant 
knowledge. But such knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for expertise to be 
effective. What matters is that the expert‟s decision licenses a train of other 
judgements and actions that attempt to align the world with the decision. 
Sociologically speaking, expertise is the most potent non-violent form of power 
available. While there may be resistance to various expert pronouncements, the 
resistance is channelled in quite specific ways. Experts are clearly marked by their 
formal training, which opponents must somehow match before issuing a credible 
challenge, which itself must be conducted by epistemically approved means, typically 
by mobilising reasons and evidence in specially designated forums, such as peer-
reviewed journals and conferences.  
 
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that „rule by experts‟ entails a rigidly 
governed society. On the contrary, we currently live under such „rule‟ and conditions 
are fluid. Given that the expert‟s power derives from her sphere of discretion, one 
should expect a variety of judgements and actions to be licensed. For example, two 
qualified physicians confronted with the same patient may offer quite different 
diagnoses and treatments. The mark of expert rule is that such variability is tolerated, 
instead of taken as grounds for charging incompetence on the part of the experts, if 
not incoherence of the body of expert knowledge itself. This helps to explain the 
socially destabilising effects of experts challenging each other. Under normal 
circumstances, experts are presumed competent in their spheres of discretion and are 
credited for the good consequences of their decisions but, as much as possible, are 
excused from the bad ones by attributing them to factors legitimately unforeseen by 
the expert. But this policy is predicated on experts exercising a measure of self-
discipline in the kinds of cases they agree to decide. Put bluntly, they need to turn 
down cases whose initial likelihood of failure is too high.  
 
This last point suggests that the appropriate ancient precedent for my view of 
expertise is not the sceptics but the stoics: Whereas the sceptics questioned our 
general ability to define concepts with sufficient certainty to serve as reliable bases 
for knowledge, the stoics proposed that our concepts work perfectly well in the 
paradigm cases for which they were intended but become uncertain beyond that point 
(Fuller 2005). The original example that distinguished these two positions remains 
enshrined in logic textbooks as „the paradox of the heap‟, or „sorites‟, to keep to the 
original Greek. It is basically the idea that one grain of sand does not constitute a 
heap, but if you keep adding more grains, at some point the next grain will constitute 
a heap. Thus, sceptics concluded that „heap‟ – and, by extension, all concepts – is 
hopelessly unclear. For their part, stoics argued that all that is shown by the paradox is 
that concepts cannot be applied indefinitely. 
 
Successful experts normally have a stoic‟s sense of the conceptual limits within which 
they should operate. Like Socrates, they know what they do not know. However, 
much of Tetlock‟s work is designed to nudge experts outside this epistemic comfort 
zone, effectively getting them to relax their self-discipline. While Tetlock sees 
himself as probing the limits of expert knowledge, he is arguably destroying expertise, 
or at least violating one of its essential preconditions by supposing that an expert in a 
given field should display a uniform competence in judging all matters logically and 
counterfactually related to that field – and not simply the range of matters on which 
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the expert would normally be expected to pass judgement. Tetlock is most explicit on 
this point when he asks experts to unpack possible futures in terms of finer grained 
outcomes, only to discover (perhaps unsurprisingly) that they manage to confer on 
these specific possibilities greater plausibility than their original judgements of the 
more generally stated outcomes would logically permit (Tetlock 2005: 189-218).  
 
An experiment of this sort reflects Tetlock‟s implicit understanding of judgment as 
applied science, that is, the translation of knowledge of potentially universal scope 
to specific cases. Thus, as Tetlock admits, the hedgehogs are better prepared than 
the foxes to parry what he calls “close-call” counterfactual scenarios, in which 
small perturbations in real conditions would have led to quite different outcomes. 
Hedgehogs tend to stick to their original predictive frameworks and explain away 
counterfactuals as “exceptions that prove the rule” or as products of overactive 
imaginations or unlikely factors, whereas the foxes are more easily led to admit 
many more realistic possible outcomes than their theories would seem to allow 
(Tetlock 2000: 212-13). Thus, playing the hedgehog, an international-relations 
“realist” (balance-of-power theorist) said, “I‟ll change my mind in response to real 
but not imaginary evidence. Show me an actual case of balancing failing” (ibid. 
212).  The difference seems to be that hedgehogs are firmly anchored in the 
paradigm cases of their expertise, whereas foxes are always playing with the 
limiting cases, making them better able to capture the nuances in real-world 
situations but also more easily disoriented when the divide separating the actual 
and possible worlds is blurred or erased, as when asked by the experimenter to 
consider close-call counterfactuals. At that point, one might say, the foxes treat the 
extra imagination required to specify possible outcomes as if it constituted 
additional evidence for their likelihood.  
 
Tetlock‟s (2003) research into „thinking the unthinkable‟ provides an entry point to 
further interpretation. When experts are asked to make fine-grained judgements about 
alternate pasts or futures, they are often forced to entertain, in his jargon, „taboo 
cognitions‟, which is to say, that they must trade off a sacred value against a secular 
value. In the case of experts, the „sacred value‟ violated in Tetlock‟s (2005) scenarios 
amounts to the boundary surrounding an expert‟s sphere of discretion. Of course, an 
expert can be made to overstep that boundary but then the nature of the judgement is 
transformed, rendering the expert, in some sense, humiliated. In that case, some 
follow-up action – what Tetlock calls „moral cleansing‟ -- is needed to re-establish the 
expert‟s authority, evidence for which can be found among both foxes and especially 
hedgehogs, who are inclined to accuse the experimenter of impertinence, if not 
outright deception, in getting them to relax their normal standards of what is 
impossible or inevitable. The original home for such discussion of moral cleansing is 
Emile Durkheim‟s (1964) account of sacred and profane uses of space in society. Not 
surprisingly, in Tetlock‟s (2003) earlier thought experiments, devout Christians were 
asked to place monetary values on the termination of certain human lives or to 
entertain the psychodynamic consequences for Jesus had he been raised in a single-
parent home.  
 
It is important to be clear about exactly how Tetlock‟s thought experiments elicit 
„taboo cognitions‟ from subjects. It is by inviting them to convert a difference in kind 
to one of degree, or to reduce a qualitative distinction to a quantitative one. When 
expert historians or pundits are cajoled into exploring possibilities other than those 
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they normally consider permissible, the distinctness of their subject matter starts to 
disappear – one consequence of which, of course, is that other people start to appear 
equally expert. For example, once theologians take seriously the idea of pricing 
human lives, economists are implicitly brought into the conversation. Devote too 
much concern to Jesus‟ upbringing and psychoanalysts enter the picture, as in fact 
they did, courtesy of Albert Schweitzer.  
 
A similar result awaits an ordinary religious believer who ascribes too many human 
qualities – even their greatest possible versions -- to the deity. This is why theological 
orthodoxy in the Abrahamic faiths has tended to treat God-talk analogically, not 
literally. Without this semantic boundary work, the Biblical claim that humans are 
created „in the image and likeness of God‟ could easily slide into the ceding of 
theological ground to social scientists, as God comes to be seen as a utopian 
projection, a superlative human being whose powers we might come to approximate 
through collective effort. Thus, the „profane‟ character of doctrines of human 
perfectibility and social progress has less to do with their formal opposition to 
organized religion than their direct competition with it, as in the salvation narratives 
promoted by Comtean positivism and Marxist socialism (Milbank 1990).  
 
In general, we might say that rationality becomes a fully secular mental process once 
we become adept at making value tradeoffs. Decisions that had been previously 
regarded, in Tetlock‟s jargon, as „taboo‟ (sacred v. profane) or „tragic‟ (sacred v. 
sacred) become simply „efficient‟. Put a bit a more crassly: No end is unconditional – 
everything has its price. Historically this view has been associated with a heightened 
sense of personal responsibility for the consequences of one‟s decisions. In other 
words, reason no longer possesses us – in the sense of compelling a particular 
outcome to our thinking: rather, we possess it. An interesting precedent for 
considering this matter is the social history of the sublimation of violence, which has 
evolved from our being driven to violence by animal instinct to more calculated 
inflictions of cruelty in service of some higher goal (cf. Collins 1974). 
 
Explanations – as well as excuses and condemnations – for violent episodes in human 
history come most easily when they are presented as stand alone „events‟ with clear 
perpetrators and victims, as in the case of the „Holocaust‟. Yet, much of this clarity is 
an artefact of hindsight created by retrospective accounts that privilege the 
perspective of one or the other side of the violence. Violence is sublimated when 
correctives to this historical bias are incorporated into one‟s own sphere of action. For 
example, in Nazi Germany, genocide was incrementally instituted over time, not as an 
explicit policy but as a by-product of some other policy that had the same 
consequences. The overall violence committed was diffused by making full use of 
two features of complex modern societies: the bureaucratisation of public 
administration (whereby each functionary‟s responsibility is formally circumscribed, 
placing each functionary‟s discretionary authority in the same position as that of an 
expert) and language‟s capacity to refer to something by its defining properties rather 
than its proper name. Of course, it also helps to be on the winning side of history, 
which the Nazis failed to be (Fuller 2006: chap. 14).  
 
My interest here is, of course, not to rehabilitate the Nazis but to suggest a context in 
which Tetlock-like exercises in taboo cognition could serve to erode conventional 
moral intuitions in aid of fostering more advanced moral reflection. A comparable 
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long-standing case for consideration is the range of politically permissible responses 
to extreme global poverty, which may succeed in achieving, in a more diffused and 
finessed way, what the Nazis arguably aimed for, namely, a very studied form of 
negligence that manages to subordinate the suffering of potentially identifiable classes 
of victims to some promised greater good. Here one could manipulate several 
variables in getting subjects to consider at what point, say, a sweatshop becomes a 
labour camp, starvation becomes torture, and so forth. It is important to stress that the 
point of such an exercise would not be to induce moral scepticism but to destroy the 
illusion that „the immoral‟ is a realm clearly signposted and hence easily avoided by 
the scrupulous. Rather, much in the spirit of existentialism‟s „dirty hands‟ principle, 
potential for immorality is present in all judgements, which are ultimately „arbitrary‟ 
in the strict sense of requiring discretion for which one is then personally responsible. 
The result of such awareness may be to increase our capacity for decisiveness, 
tolerance and forgiveness.  
 
But even outside the unavoidable controversies surrounding moral judgements, the 
cultivation of taboo cognitions can have explosive effects. The clearest cases in point 
may be drawn from the history of science. Imagine a time travelling Tetlock who asks 
a 16
th
 century anatomist to think about how the liver might function under conditions 
that would quite clearly threaten the normal functioning of the human body. For the 
anatomist, this would be an invitation to countenance a taboo cognition, as he would 
need to offset the secular value of sheer intellectual curiosity against religiously 
inspired normative constraints on the practice of anatomy itself, which limited 
dissections of the human body and, in any case, treated the liver as a proper part of the 
body, an organ, not a stand-alone piece of organic matter. Of course, the last five 
hundred years have served to secularise the study of the human body so that an 
anatomist today would find the question quite ordinary. „Liver‟ is now defined in 
more functional than substantive terms – that is, not as something with a particular 
look, feel, composition or origin, but simply whatever can reliably act as the chemical 
conversion plant for the human body. In the meanwhile, the human body itself has 
come to be seen mainly as a self-maintaining system consisting of potentially 
replaceable parts that are increasingly made to order, and may routinely come to be 
so, if stem cell research continues to make progress.  
 
I raise this point because the history of anatomy is indicative of what happened to 
most ancient forms of expertise in the wake of the 17
th
 century Scientific Revolution: 
Their objects lost their sacred boundaries as differences in kind were rendered into 
ones of degree, such that two states that had been seen as radically different (even 
violently opposed) – such as movement and rest, living and dead, earthly and stellar, 
human and animal – came to be seen as two poles of a continuum that may be studied 
by common means and even experimentally manipulated (Funkenstein 1986). The 
critical side of the Scientific Revolution conjured up thought experiments very much 
in the spirit of Tetlock‟s „thinking the unthinkable‟, namely, to elicit contradictory 
responses at the conceptual edges of existing expertises that served to trigger a 
fundamental rethinking of – say, in Galileo‟s case -- the nature of motion (Kuhn 
1977). The net effect of this transformation – the rendering of the constant variable, if 
you will – was a shift from Aristotle‟s view of reality as a patchwork of discrete 
domains of being to Newton‟s unified vision under which all objects are products of 
the same set of laws, rendered intelligible by the same set of cognitive processes, 
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albeit operating in different proportions under different conditions. (The locus 
classicus of this thesis is Cassirer 1953). 
 
In an early work, very much in the spirit of the cognitive and social psychology of 
science popular in the day, I proposed the experimental discipline of axioaetiotics, 
whose name is a Greek-rooted neologism for studying the value-causes nexus in 
people‟s thought (Fuller 1993: 167-175; cf. Axtell 1993). The premise of this 
discipline is that even the legitimacy of our basic concepts of epistemic authority – 
not least those relating to science itself -- presuppose a certain understanding of how 
they came to acquire that authority, the limits of which could be tested if not 
subverted by presenting historical counterfactuals. Indeed, Thomas Kuhn notoriously, 
but correctly, claimed that practicing scientists needed an „Orwellian‟ (aka Whig) 
understanding of their own history, one that airbrushed all the complexities and 
alternative trajectories of the past in aid of streamlined account that justifies the 
current research frontier being just as it is (Kuhn 1970: 167; cf. Fuller 2000: 
Introduction). These implicit narratives of legitimation are delicately poised between 
a hedgehog‟s overdetermined and a fox‟s underdetermined view of intellectual 
history. This normative equilibrium may be easily disturbed, as Tetlock (2005) does 
in chapters 5-7, by appealing to interpretations of the past that, while not part of the 
legitimatory lore, nevertheless are taken seriously by professional historians. An 
example from the history of science follows. 
 
The idea that science gets at some fundamental reality seems to require that the 
foundational theory of modern physics, Newtonian mechanics, could have – even 
would have – been developed by someone else, had Newton never come along. The 
underlying intuition is clear enough: There is sufficient objective validity to Newton‟s 
project that others pursuing similar leads with similar information (as was the case in 
17
th
 century Europe) sooner or later would have, more or less, arrived at his 
conclusions. In this respect, Newton himself was an historical accident vis-à-vis the 
scientific ideas and findings associated with him, which could (or would) have been 
eventually made by others. This is very much in the mould of the hedgehog, and it 
invites talk of scientific progress being hastened or arrested, but all within a common 
narrative framework.  
 
However, not everything about the history of science can be as contingent as 
Newton‟s specific existence. It is also presumed that only within a certain range of 
historical possibilities could some Newton-like form of physics have developed. If not 
in Europe, such a physics would have developed only in a culture (perhaps China) 
that had already made conceptual and technical moves comparable to the intellectual 
giants on whose shoulders Newton proverbially claimed to have stood. Moreover, the 
cultural import of such alternate achievements in those other places and times would 
have to be similar. For example, it would be quite jarring to learn that the Chinese 
arrived at the concepts and formulae of Newtonian mechanics – but in the context of 
designing a children‟s game or some other culturally trivial activity. Science is more 
than simply knowing the right equations and making the right predictions: It also 
requires that that its practices are accorded high epistemic standing in society.  
 
Thus, to suggest, say, that East Africans possessed the concept of quantum 
uncertainty prior to Western contact without having passed through anything 
comparable to the Newtonian revolution (Van Sertima 1983) or, less radically but 
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more plausibly, that the modern principle of inertia was introduced by 14
th
 century 
scholastics who failed to see the lethal blow it dealt to the Church‟s geocentric 
cosmology (Duhem 1954) is to challenge at once orthodox opinions about science and 
the nature of the thing called „science‟. In the two cases just cited, the normative 
destabilisation was deliberate and has been palpable. The former was originally 
proposed as part of an argument for the equalisation of African and European forms 
of knowledge, the latter as part of an argument for the continuity of physical science 
and natural theology – both „taboo cognitions‟, in Tetlock‟s sense.   
 
I have employed versions of the latter taboo strategy in defending intelligent design 
theory as an alternative to the Neo-Darwinian orthodoxy in biology (e.g. Fuller 2010). 
In particular, I have stressed that science would not have acquired, and perhaps cannot 
continue to sustain, its „view from nowhere‟ sense of objectivity towards all of reality 
– and not merely to what is relevant to our species survival – without faith in the idea 
that we have been specially designed to make sense of it all. This self-understanding 
of humanity is peculiar to the Abrahamic religions. In contrast, had Western science 
been consistently oriented towards species survival, as Darwinists urge, we would not 
have taken such a keen interest in, nor conferred so much cultural value on, nor, for 
that matter, risk so much on behalf of, the pursuit of reality‟s physical limits. 
Darwin‟s ablest defender, Thomas Henry Huxley (1893) put the point well, when he 
said that Newton the Christian had to precede Darwin the apostate -- not the other 
way round – to explain the zeal with which we have reshaped nature in our own 
image, a project that would seem like sheer hubris, if not insanity, had humans always 
seen themselves as simply one amongst many species. (Huxley was worried that as 
Darwinism became part of humanity‟s self-understanding in the 20th century, 
scientific progress would come to a halt.)  
 
One can imagine presenting Huxley‟s counterfactual to irreligious scientists today, 
asking them to imagine how Western science would have reached the comprehensive 
achievement of modern physics, had Darwin come to be accepted first. They would 
probably think it possible, but it would be interesting to see exactly how they would 
flesh out the details of an alternate history that does not depart too far from the main 
tendencies in the actual history. In particular, where would one find the motive to 
conceptualise all of reality under a finite set of mathematical laws, if one begins with 
an essentially earthbound, species egalitarian view of the natural world? To be sure, a 
Darwin-first history would allow for the development of quite sophisticated 
technologies, including mathematical techniques, all in aid of human survival across 
vast swathes of space and time. Thus, the physical sciences could plausibly reach the 
heights of Chinese civilization. But the Chinese did not think it reasonable, or even 
interesting, to unify all of knowledge under a single intellectual rubric.  
 
Of course, our scientist-subjects might dismiss all this scenario-mongering as sheer 
fantasy, as science really stands on its own track record, whatever theological motives 
may have been operative in the past. It is a pity, then, that our sense of science‟s track 
record is subject to so much confirmation bias. We easily recall and even oversell 
science‟s empirical and practical successes, while ignoring or underestimating the 
costs, failures and outright disasters. Perhaps the next frontier for „thinking the 
unthinkable‟ is to get experts and lay people from a variety of backgrounds to draw up 
balance sheets for science. My guess is that the resulting track record will look so 
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chequered that science may need to rekindle its ties to theology to ensure its future 
legitimacy. 
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